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ABSTRACT
Many widely used Internet messaging and calling apps, such as
WhatsApp, Viber, Telegram, and Signal, have deployed an end-to-
end encryption functionality. To defeat potentialman-in-the-middle
attackers against the key exchange protocol, the approach crucially
relies upon users to perform a code verification task whereby each
user must compare the code (a fingerprint of the cryptographic
keys) computed by her app with the one computed by the other
user’s app and reject the session if the two codes do not match.
In this paper, we study the security and usability of this human-
centered code verification task for a prominent setting where the
end users are remotely located, and compare it as a baseline to a
potentially less frequent scenario where the end users are in close
proximity. We consider several variations of the code presentation
and code verification methods, incorporated into representative
real-world apps, including codes encoded as numbers or images,
displayed on the screen, and verbally spoken by the users. We
perform a carefully-designed human factors study in a lab setting
to quantify the security and usability of these different methods.
Our study results expose key weaknesses in the security and
usability of the code verification methods employed in the remote
end-to-end encryption apps. First, we show that generallymost code
verification methods offer poor security (high false accepts) and low
usability (high false rejects and low user experience ratings) in the
remote setting. Second, we demonstrate that, security and usability
under the remote code verification setting is significantly lower
than that in the proximity code verification setting. We attribute
this result to the increased cognitive overhead associated with
comparing the codes across two apps on the same device (remote
setting) rather than across two devices (proximity setting). Overall,
our work serves to highlight a serious fundamental vulnerability of
Internet-based communication apps in the remote setting stemming
from human errors.
1 INTRODUCTION
Many widely deployed Internet-based messaging and calling ap-
plications, such as WhatsApp [14], Viber [12], Telegram [10] and
Signal [8], have deployed an end-to-end encryption (E2EE) feature,
to hide the communications from the attackers and even from the
service providers. Using this approach, all the communication be-
tween the end users gets encrypted/authenticated with a key held
only by the communication parties. To share the secret key, the
end users run a key exchange protocol (e.g., [7, 9, 16, 35]) over the
insecure public Internet (or a channel controlled by the application
service provider). The key exchange protocol then results in an ini-
tial master key that is used subsequently to generate session keys
for encrypting all the messages, including text, data, and voice.
In contrast to typical client-to-server encryption or PKI-based
secure communication (e.g., TLS), E2EE reduces the unwanted trust
onto third parties (e.g., an online server), because such services
may themselves get compromised, be malicious or under the coer-
cion of law enforcement authorities. However, the key exchange
protocol runs over unauthenticated insecure channel and is there-
fore susceptible to a Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attack [1, 36]. To
defeat potential MITM attacks against the key exchange protocol,
E2EE apps compute a readable/exchangeable “security code” (a
fingerprint of the key exchange protocol) that is used to provide
end-to-end authentication.
The E2EE apps crucially rely upon the users to perform a code
verification task whereby each user exchanges and compares the
security code computed on her end with the one computed by
the peer’s device, and must reject the session if the codes do not
match. In this context, the failure of the users in matching the codes
(i.e., accepting completely or partially mismatching codes) will be
catastrophic in terms of security as it will lead to the success of the
MITM attacker and exposure of all communicated messages. The
users are usually in possession of only their mobile devices using
which the communication takes place, not any other devices or aids
(such as paper-pencil), during this code verification task.
Remote vs. Proximity Code Verification: Security code verifica-
tion has long been used in multiple security applications, primarily
by the users that are located in a close physical proximity (e.g., in
device pairing [27] and decentralized trust management [18] appli-
cations). However, Internet messaging and voice applications open
up an important area of remote communications for people who are
at distant locations, and have never met each other or are likely to
start communicating using the apps before they meet in person.
The remote communication paradigm presents many challenges
for code verification compared to proximity settings, especially due
to the lack of physical interaction between the users. Therefore, the
users are required to exchange the code over an auxiliary channel
(e.g., a voice call or an out-of-band channel such as SMS and email),
and then compare the codes across two apps (e.g., an SMS messaging
app and the E2EE app) on the same device. Such “cross-app compar-
isons” might impose cognitive burden on the users, since they may
be required to memorize the received code and compare it with
the one displayed on the E2EE app. In contrast, in the proximity
setting, code comparisons seem much simpler since the users are
close by and compare the codes across two devices. Figure 1 and 2
depicts the proximity and remote settings, respectively.
Our Focus—Security and Usability Study of Remote Code
Verification: In this paper, we study the security and usability of
the human-centered E2EE code verification specially in a “remote
setting”. As a baseline, we compare the results with a “proximity
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1. The users open the code verification screen and compare the computed 
code  on  their  screen  with  the  one  computed  on  the  peer’s  device 
(“cross-device code comparison”).
2. The  MITM  attack  succeeds  if  the  two  users  fail  to  verify  the 
mismatching codes.
Figure 1: Proximity setting (cross-device comparison)
setting”. Although the security and usability of the code verification
for various security applications in a proximity setting has been
studied in literature before [21, 24, 27, 28, 34], to our knowledge,
this is the first study of the code verification in a potentially more
common remote setting in the context of end-to-end messaging
and voice apps.
We study several remote/proximity code presentation and veri-
fication methods covering approaches deployed by popular E2EE
apps, including, WhatsApp [14], Viber [12], Telegram [10], Signal
[8], Threema [11], Wickr Me[15], and ChatSecure [2].
The founding hypothesis of our study is that remote code verifi-
cation will be highly error prone for end users to perform due to the
challenges associated with the remote setting outlines above. Our
goal is not to argue on the attackers’ ability to manipulate the code
(via either tampering with the key exchange protocol or tampering
with the out-of-band channel) or the amount of the manipulation,
but rather to mainly determine how well the users can detect the
mismatching codes in the presence of an attack that can partially
manipulate the code.
To test this hypothesis, we design a human factors study in a
controlled lab setting to measure the accuracy of the users in veri-
fying the security codes. In the study, we present the participants
with several matching codes, representing a benign, “attack-free”
scenario, and mismatching codes representing an MITM attack case.
For the security assessment, we use False Accept Rate (FAR) as our
metric specifying instances of accepting the mismatching codes by
the users. Failure of detecting the mismatching codes indicates the
success of the attack.
For the usability assessment, we quantify user perception
through System Usability Scale (SUS) questionnaires [20] and user
perception ratings. As an additional usability metric, we use False
Reject Rate (FRR) indicating the instances of rejecting the matching
codes or the benign case by the users. Rejecting the benign cases
may force the users to restart the protocol, and therefore, affects
the usability of the system as the process would need to be repeated
possibly annoying the users and delaying their communications.
For our security and usability assessments, we consider several
representative remote code presentations and code verification
methods, including, numeric and image codes exchanged over out-
of-band messaging channels (e.g., SMS and email), and verbally
spoken codes exchanged over Internet calls. In the proximity setting,
we consider the QR, compared almost automatically by the apps,
numeric and image code, compared visually by the users.
1. The users open the code verification screen and transfer the code over 
an auxiliary channel.
2. The users compare the computed code on their E2EE app screen with 
the one received from the peer’s device (“cross-app code comparison”).
3. MITM attack succeeds if the users fail to verify mismatching codes.
Transfer	  the	  code	  over	  	  
an	  auxiliary	  channel	  
Internet	  
Figure 2: Remote setting (cross-app comparison)
While our study involves several code presentation and verifi-
cation methods, the primary goal of our study is to compare the
remote setting with the proximity setting and not to compare be-
tween different methods.
An Important Aspect of Our Study Methodology: Since our
hypothesis is a negative one (i.e., we mainly expect the security
of E2EE apps to be relatively poor in the remote setting), we me-
thodically design our study tailored for the near best defense condi-
tions. To prove our hypothesis, we recruit 25 young, educated, and
technology-aware participants with reasonably good computer and
security background to perform the code verification task willingly
and diligently, and with full awareness of the security task, in a
controlled observable lab environment. Given that in the existing
applications, the code verification task is optional, in practice, the
attack might be more difficult to detect, especially for average users
who are not informed about the security risks of neglectful code ver-
ification, and may often skip or click through the code verification
procedure. Moreover, in our study, we set the code verification task
as the participants’ only primary task. In real-world, in contrast,
the code verification task will be a secondary task, the primary task
being setting up the communications. Thus, if our study partici-
pants do not perform well with a single task at hand, the real-life
would potentially do even worse since they have to manage two
tasks whereby the security task may not be the high-priority task.
This study design is in contrast to the traditional usability study
designs where the goal is to demonstrate that the system is secure
or usable, in which case there is a need to prove security/usability
by recruiting a large sample of users with average technical skills
and emulating real-world conditions as much as possible.
Our PrimaryResults:Our results are alignedwith our hypothesis,
and show that the code verification methods deployed in E2EE apps
suffer from several security and usability issues arising from human
errors in verifying the codes in remote settings:
(1) Low Security for Remote Code Verification: All the remote
code verification methods have high FARs, ranging on average
from about 13% for image code verification to 40% for numeric
code verification. Further, if the attacker has more control over
the number of matching characters between an attacked code
and a legitimate code, the success rate of the attack would in-
crease. For instance, the FAR increases to about 60% in numeric
code verification, when only one digit is mismatching between
the codes. These error rates are exhibited by young educated
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participants in a unidirectional authentication setting. In prac-
tice, users with more diverse background may perform worse
than the participants in our study. Also, the error rate increases
to almost double in a bidirectional authentication setting, where
the attacker may deceive any of the two parties in an E2EE
secure channel establishment session.
(2) LowUsability forRemote CodeVerification: The results also
point out the usability issues with the remote code verification
methods. Except for the audio-based code verification, the other
remote schemes have about 20% FRR. Further, in terms of system
usability scale and the users’ personal ratings, results are indica-
tive of a poor user experience underlying the remote setting
(e.g., SUS scores around only 50%).
(3) Remote Setting vs. Proximity Setting: As our baseline con-
dition, we measured the security of the code verification in a
proximity setting, which shows that users could successfully
detect the benign and attack settings with negligible error rates.
However, in a remote setting which is the primary model of
the E2EE apps, the error rates—FAR and FRR—are (statistically)
significantly higher. Moreover, the user perception ratings in
the remote scenario were (statistically) significantly lower com-
pared to the proximity setting.
Generalizability and Broader Impacts: Overall, we believe that
our work highlights a serious fundamental vulnerability of a
broadly deployed and extensively used representative class of se-
cure Internet-based remote communication apps. This vulnerability
does not arise from the underlying cryptographic protocol or the
software implementation of the protocols, but rather from the hu-
man errors committed by naive users of these apps. It mainly stems
from the fact that, in the remote setting, comparisons of security
codes need to be performed across the apps, which is burdensome
for the users and thus highly error-prone. Such cross-app compar-
isons also significantly impact the usability of the code verification
process. Although our study focuses on many currently deployed
apps for a larger impact to real-world systems, our work is general-
izable in that it shows the security-usability pitfalls of cross-app
comparisons broadly applicable to the fundamental design of re-
mote E2EE code verifications.
Addressing this vulnerability and related usability issues will be
a challenging problem, but we hope that our work will encourage
the app designers to make necessary changes to their systems to
improve the levels of security and usability in the face of human
errors. Based on the results of the study, we also provide insights
and future directions for the designers of the apps to improve the
security and usability of their systems, without affecting the current
threat models.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 End-to-End Encryption Apps
Recently, several instant messaging (IM) and Voice over IP (VoIP)
applications adopted the E2EE protocol to provide secure communi-
cation of messages/calls. Examples of such applications are Signal
[8], WhatsApp [14], FacebookMessenger [5], Google Allo [6], Viber
[12], Telegram [10], and Threema [11] (a more comprehensive list
can be found in Appendix A.3).
Different E2EE protocols have been proposed and implemented
by the apps targeting the specific needs and challenges facing the
IM and VoIP communications. Off-the-Record Messaging (OTR)
protocol [19] by Borisov et al. is an E2EE protocol specifically
designed for IM communication, with the goal of perfect forward
secrecy (PFS) through ephemeral key exchanges to avoid long-lived
keys, authenticity of the parties, non-deniability of the messages,
and confidentiality through encryption.
Many of the current E2EE applications are constructed on top
of OTR, however, they adapted OTR to work with asynchronous
transport (which is specific to the smartphone environment) [7].
The encryption protocol introduced by Open Whisper System is
one of the leading protocols that was first developed by Signal [8],
and later implemented in WhatsApp [14], Facebook Messenger
[5], and Google Allo [6]. The protocol is based on OTR combined
with Silent Circle Instant Messaging Protocol (SCIMP) [30] for
improved forward secrecy. The protocol is also enhanced to allow
asynchronous messaging, and to simplify non-deniability [4]. Viber
[12, 13] and Telegram [9, 10] have also adopted similar protocols.
2.2 MITM Attack Resistance
The encryption key in the E2EE applications is typically exchanged
between the endpoints during an initial key exchange protocol over
the insecure channel (or a channel fully controllable by the service
provider) and is then refreshed during the message exchanges. The
basic key exchange protocol is based on the well-known Diffie-
Hellman (DH) key exchange protocol [3]. However, the basic Diffie-
Hellman key exchange protocol is not authenticated and therefore
is susceptible to the MITM attack. Hence, the applications add a
manual authentication scheme, which we refer to as “code verifica-
tion” to the key exchange to protect against MITM attack.
Regardless of the differences in the E2EE protocols developed
by different apps, they all rely on the human users to perform this
code verification task in an attempt to defeat the MITM attack. This
human-centered task is the focus of our work.
2.3 Code Generation and Presentation
For authentication, users can compare the public keys (or a fin-
gerprint/hash of the public keys) of other users over an auxiliary
channel (e.g., an out-of-band channel such as text or email, or a hu-
man voice channel). To simplify the manual comparison, the public
key or the fingerprint is encoded into a readable/exchangeable code.
We refer to this code as “security code” or in short “the code”.
Specifically, the generated code is presented as a human readable
code or an exchangeable object. Often a long code is represented as
blocks (or chunks) of few digit numbers for readability (e.g., 30-digit
presented as 6 chunks of 5-digit numbers). Figure 8 in Appendix
A.2 shows some of the common code presentations described here:
• QR Code: The code is encoded into a QR code. Since the QR
code is automatically captured and compared by the app without
relying on human user, it can contain the full public key of the
parties. Figure 8(a) shows the QR code presentation for What-
sApp, which includes a version number, the users’ identifier, and
the public key for both parties.
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• Numeric: The code is presented as a sequence of numeric digits.
WhatsApp, Signal, Telegram, and Viber use this form of pre-
sentation. Figures 8(a), 8(d), and 8(b) show the code in numeric
presentation in WhatsApp, Signal, and Viber application.
• Images: The code is encoded into an image. Examples of such
images are also presented in prior literature (e.g., [22, 31]). Tele-
gram encodes the code in a shaded blue square as shown in
Figure 8(c).
Usually a set of one ormore of thementioned presentation is used
by the apps. Other encodings such as words [26], alphanumeric,
Base32 and Base64, sentences, and phrases, have also been proposed
in literature, however, they are not being used at this moment by
any of the popular E2EE apps we study in this paper.
2.4 Code Exchange and Verification
There are two notable approaches to verify the security codes in
security applications, Copy-Confirm and Compare-Confirm as in-
troduced in [34]. In Compare-Confirm, the code is displayed on each
peer’s screen, they exchange their respective code, and both accept
or reject the connection by comparing the displayed and received
code. In Copy-Confirm, one party reads the code to the other party,
who types it onto his/her device, and gets notified whether the code
is correct or not. The E2EE apps follow the Compare-Confirm.
In a proximity setting, where the two parties are physically co-
located, the code verification can happen by visually matching the
codes (e.g., comparing the 60-digit numerical code in WhatsApp,
or comparing the graphic in Telegram app). Some apps provide
automated code comparison by embedding the code in a QR code
that can be captured and compared by the app.
In a remote setting, the two parties can exchange the codes over
an out of band channel, for example, through a text message, or
an email. This approach is very common among several apps such
as Whatsapp, and Signal. Another method of code exchange in
a remote setting is transferring the code over an authenticated
channel, for example, through a voice call (e.g., used by Viber). This
approach assumes that the human voice channel over which the
code is exchanged is authenticated.
2.5 Threat Model
In this work, we study the common threat model followed by the
E2EE applications. It is a setting where two trusted parties, Alice
and Bob, intent to start a secure communication over an insecure
channel using only their mobile devices. In this threat model, Alice’s
and Bob’s devices are trusted. However, the communication channel
over which the key is exchanged is assumed to be fully controlled
by the attacker. That is, the attacker can intercept and modify the
key exchange messages.
The key exchange protocol is followed by an authentication
phase to defeat MITM attacks. In the proximity setting, the code
exchange channel is physically-authenticated since the users are
in close proximity and can verify each other’s identity. In the re-
mote setting, the channel over which the code is transferred should
somehow be authenticated. An example of a supposedly authenti-
cated channel is out of band messaging (e.g., SMS, email or social
media). Another authenticated channel used by the applications is
voice channel. The assumption is that the users can recognize each
other’s voice, and therefore, can authenticate each other when the
code is spoken. However, as we discuss below, even the out-of-band
or voice channels may be tampered with, at least partially.
Attacker Capability:We consider two levels of capability for the
attacker. First, we assume that the attacker does not have any con-
trol over the out-of-band or voice channel. This assumption is
generally made by the app designers and motivates them to trans-
fer the code over such channels. Even though the attacker has zero
control over the channel, she can interfere with the key exchange
protocol and run a preimage attack1 on the security codes to gen-
erate attacked codes that are the same or at least partially similar
to the legitimate security codes (in a hope that the user accepts it
due to similarity with the legitimate code). The attacker’s goal is
to guess the public key pairs that generate codes with maximum
similarity to the protocol’s legitimate security code. However, the
computational cost limits the success level of the attack. This level
of capability is considered for the attacker in several prior studies
about public key fingerprint security [21, 25].
Second, we assume that the attacker has control over some part
of the messages transferred over the out-of-band or voice channel.
That is, the attacker may be able to tamper with the exchanged
codes partially. The attacker first interferes with the key exchange
protocol, which results in two different codes at the two parties.
Then during the code exchange, the attacker tampers with the
messages transmitted over the out-of-band or voice channel by
inserting or modifying one or more bits of the transmitted code.
For example, if codeA = 1234 and codeB = 4567, the attacker may
change codeB , while it is being transmitted to Alice, to 1534 (a code
that is different from codeA in only 1 digit).
As an example for the voice-based channel, the attackermay have
access to some pre-recorded samples of the user’s voice, speaking
some of the digits that appear in the code (1, 3, and 4 in codeA, but
not 2). The attacker then tampers with the voice messages of Bob,
while Bob reads the code to Alice, and injects those pre-collected
samples (i.e., change 4 to 1, 6 to 3, and 7 to 4) so that codeB received
by Alice is 1534. Such an attack is known as a voice MITM attack
[32], which allows the attacker to tamper with the voice channel
by mimicking users’ voice or playing the pre-recorded samples.
Another instance of such part manipulation pertains to altering
the codes transmitted over the text-based channels, such as SMS,
emails, or even social media posts. Most of the E2EE apps allow
exchanging and sharing of the codes on different messaging and
social media applications. This gives the attacker the opportunity
to compromise any of these applications or the user accounts to
modify the exchanged code. Also, email and SMS spoofing2 is a
common problem that would make such attacks highly feasible
in practice. Since some of these apps have a character limit (e.g.,
Twitter and SMS apps), they may not be able to accommodate the
code in one message, and therefore have to split the code into few
parts. If the attacker is able to modify some of these fragmented
parts, the attacked code appear to be similar to the legitimate code.
In summary, we allow these two levels of capability for the
attacker, that is, the attacker may have zero or partial control over
the code, and can modify it partly via a pre-image attack indirectly
1A preimage attack on hash functions tries to find a message with a specific hash.
2e.g., a website, http://www.smsgang.com/, can be used to send spoofed SMS messages.
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or via tampering with the auxiliary channel directly. It is worth
noting that the attacker who has full control over the code may
change the code such that it completely matches a legitimate code
and be impossible for the users to detect. In this light, such a full
manipulation attack is not the focus of our study, since this attack
may have 100% success rate (unless a user mistakenly rejects this
“attacked” matching code, which as our study shows happens up to
only about 20% of the times).
3 STUDY PRELIMINARIES AND GOALS
3.1 Study Objectives
The specific goals of the study are outlined below:
Robustness: How accurate are the users in verifying the code? Ro-
bustness directly impacts two important properties of the system:
security and usability.
• For security assessment, we are interested in determining how
often users accept mismatching security codes. False Accept Rate
(FAR) denotes the probability of incorrectly accepting such in-
stances. False acceptance implies the success of the MITM attack
and the compromise of the system.
• For usability assessment, we are interested in finding out how
often users reject matching security codes. False Reject Rate (FRR)
represents the probability of incorrectly rejecting benign in-
stances. False rejection forces the users to restart the protocol
affecting the overall usability.
User Experience and Perception: How usable do the users find
the code verification task. We define the following parameters to
measure the usability of the system:
• System Usability Scale (SUS): How easy or difficult do the users
find the system? Can the user easily learn how to use the system?
Do they need the support of a technical person?
• Comfort: How comfortable are users with the system?
• Satisfaction: How satisfied are the users with the system in veri-
fying the codes?
• Adoptability: Are they willing to use the system in real-life?
3.2 Selected Applications
We selected a collection of highly popular and representative apps,
based on the number of installations and ratings, to comprehensively
cover different code verification methods including QR, textual,
image, and voice verification. In the textual presentation, we only
picked numeric presentation, given that it is the most commonly
adopted method.
To cover all the state-of-the-art code presentation and verifica-
tion methods, and based on the popularity of the apps, we picked
WhatsApp (v.2.16.201), Viber (v.6.2.1251), Telegram (v.3.10.1), and
Signal (v.3.15.2) in our study. The complete list of studied apps is
described in Appendix A.3.
App #1—WhatsApp: WhatsApp displays the code as a QR code
and a 60-digit number represented as 12 blocks of 5-digit number.
The QR code includes a version number, the user’s identifier, and
the identity key for both parties. WhatsApp generates its 60-digit
(480-bit code by concatenating the 30-digit fingerprint of the users’
public Identity Keys3. To calculate the fingerprint, iteratively SHA-
512 of the public key is computed for 5200 times and the first 30
bytes of the final result is output as the security code.
Users have two options to verify each other’s identity. First, they
can scan the QR code of the peer user; the app then compares and
verifies the codes. This feature is helpful if the users are in close
proximity. Second, the app allows the users to exchange the code
through email or messaging applications and then manually verify
the code. This feature can be used in the remote setting.
App #2—Viber: In Viber, both devices perform DH key exchange
using their own private keys and the peer’s public key. The DH
result is hashed using SHA256 and trimmed to 160 bits. The code is
encoded as 48 digits, displayed as 12 blocks of 4-digit numbers.
To verify the code, the two parties should make a Viber call,
during which they can open the verification screen. The users
verbally announce the displayed code to each other and validate
the identity of the peer if the spoken code and the displayed code
match. Viber does not support any other out-of-band or automated
code verification method.
App #3—Telegram: Telegram generates the code by using the first
128 bits of SHA1 of the initial key (generated when Telegram Secret
Chat is first established) followed by the first 160 bits of SHA256
of the key used when the Secret Chat is updated to layer 464. The
code is displayed to the users as a shaded blue image along with a
string of 64 hexadecimal characters. Telegram does not provide a
facility to send the code directly from the app.
App #4—Signal: The version of Signal used in the study displays
the full 256 bits of the public key hash as a hexadecimal string and
a QR code. The users can scan the QR codes to verify each other’s
identity in a proximity setting or transfer it over an out-of-band
channel in a remote setting.
3.3 Study Assumptions and Hypotheses
Our hypothesis is that the apps offer a low security level, due to
human errors, in verifying the code and that the users find the code
verification to have poor usability.
Since our hypothesis is negative (apps provide a low level of se-
curity and poor usability), we design our study tailored for the near
best possible success of the attack. We assume that the applications
inform the users about the E2EE feature and importance of the
code verification task. We also assume that the users are required
to perform the code verification task. Also, we target young, and
educated users who are technology-aware. We also assume that the
users perform the code verification task whether they are planning
to start a conversation with a peer or not. This assumption implies
that users consider the code verification task as a primary task. In
practice, the primary task of the users is to pursue a conversation
and only the secondary task is to verify the code.
All these assumptions make the attack more difficult since: (1)
the users are well-informed about the security risks associated with
incorrect code verification, (2) the users are enforced and willing
to verify the code, (3) the users perform the task carefully, and (4)
they are only focused on a single task of code verification.
3Identity Key is the long-term Curve25519 key pair generated at install time
4In Telegram, the layer number is initialized at 8 when the Secret Chat is created and
is updated after receiving packets (for details, see https://core.telegram.org/api/end-to-
end.)
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4 STUDY DESIGN
Our study was designed to evaluate the security and usability of
the code verification according to the objectives defined in Section
3.1. The study was approved by our Institutional Review Board and
standard ethical procedures were followed, e.g., participants being
informed, given choice to discontinue, and not deceived.
4.1 Code Verification Challenges
We considered two types of code verification challenges in the
study, representing benign and attack cases:
Mismatching Codes: For each set of code verification tasks, we
defined three instances of mismatching code pairs representing the
attack setting5. To study the accuracy of the participants in recog-
nizing the attacked session, except for Telegram app6, we created a
code with only one mismatching character, a code with one block
of mismatching characters (the position of the mismatching char-
acter/block(s) was randomly selected), and a completely incorrect
code. We recall that the threat model allows partial manipulation
of the codes through the preimage attack or access to part of the
messages transferred over the auxiliary channel.
Matching Codes: For each set of code verification tasks, we had
two instances of matching codes representing the benign case.
4.2 Experimental Setup and Tested Schemes
To support our study, we designed a survey using the LimeService
platform. The survey presented all the information and instructions
to the participants and guided them to complete the tasks.
To perform the tasks, each participant was provided with an
Android phone. The four applications (WhatsApp, Viber, Telegram,
and Signal) were setup on the phone and five contact names and
numbers, associated with the study examiner, were stored in the
contact list. Android is one of the most popular platforms and all
of our participants perfectly knew how to operate the smartphone.
The examiner (we call him Bob) acted as the peer in the com-
munication set-up only to read, transfer, or to show the security
codes to the participant (we call her Alice). In the benign case, Bob
displayed or read the correct codes, while in the attack case, he
showed incorrect codes.
In the proximity setting, Alice and Bob sat next to each other.
The proximity setting consisted of three types of code verification
methods summarized in Table 2 (Appendix A.2):
• P1-QR – Signal QR Code Verification: In this task, Alice
opens the code verification screen for each contact on the Signal
app to capture the QR code for Bob. The app then compares the
internal copy of Alice’s code with the captured one.
• P2-Image – Telegram Image Code Verification: Alice and
Bob open the code verification screen for a particular conver-
sation. Bob shows the image to Alice who should compare and
verify the image.
• P3-Numeric – WhatsApp Numeric Code Verification: Al-
ice and Bob open the code verification screens for a particular
5Implementation of the MITM attack is not within the scope of this work and all of
the codes were generated manually to emulate the attack.
6Since we did not have access to the Telegram image generation tool and the encoding
from the fingerprint to the image was unknown to us, we do not have control over the
number of incorrect/mismatching characters.
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•  R1-Audio: Audio Code with Viber, exchanged over Viber call. 
•  R2-Image: Image Code with Telegram, exchanged as text message.
•  R3-Numeric: Numeric code with WhatsApp, exchanged as text message.
•  P1-QR: Code with Signal.
•  P2-Image: Image Code with Telegram.
•  P3-Numeric: Numeric code with WhatsApp.
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5 challenges in each verification task
•  2 matching codes.
•  3 mis-matching codes (1-character, 1-block, whole code mismatch).
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Repeat for 
all 
challenges
Main Study PhasePre-Study Phase Post-Study Phase
Figure 3: Protocol Flow of the user study.
conversation. Bob shows the screen to Alice who observes and
verifies the code.
In the remote setting, Alice and Bob sat in two different rooms
to simulate a remote communication scenario. The remote setting
consisted of three types of code verification methods (summarized
in Table 2, Appendix A.2):
• R1-Audio – Viber Audio Code Verification: In this method,
Alice calls the given contacts on the Viber app. Bob picks up the
Viber call, and the two open the code verification screens. Then,
Bob speaks the code and Alice compares the spoken code and
the displayed one.
• R2-Image – Telegram Image Code Verification: In this
method, Bob sends the image in a text (SMS) message to Al-
ice. Alice compares the code on the Telegram screen with the
code on the text message screen by switching between the two
apps. That is, Alice needs to open one app to memorize the image
code, then move on to the second app and compare the code.
• R3-Numeric –WhatsApp Numeric Code Verification: This
type of code verification works similar to the image code verifi-
cation method. The only difference is that the numeric code is
exchanged in a text message or email, and Alice compares the
numeric code on the WhatsApp screen with the code on the text
message screen by switching between the two apps.
4.3 Study Protocol
Figure 3 provides the high-level design protocol flow of the study.
After a brief introduction to the study, the participants were nav-
igated by the examiner to a computer desk that had the survey
web-site open, and were provided with a smartphone. The par-
ticipants were informed about the E2EE feature and the risk of
accepting incorrect codes. They were asked to follow the instruc-
tions on the survey website and perform the tasks diligently as
presented on the website. The study was composed of three phases:
the pre-study, the main study, and the post-study phase.
4.3.1 Pre-Study Phase. The pre-study phase consisted of several
qualitative and quantitative questions grouped into three categories,
as summarized below:
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Demographics: The participants were asked to fill out a demo-
graphic questionnaire. These questions polled for each participant’s
age, gender and education.
Technical Background: The participants were asked about their
general computer and security skills to uncover their initial attitude
towards security.
Familiarity with the Topic: To understand the participants’ ex-
perience in performing the tasks, they were asked about their fa-
miliarity with messaging applications and the E2EE feature offered
by the apps.
4.3.2 Main-Study Phase. During the main-study phase, we pre-
sented several code verification challenges to the participants. We
also asked them to rate their experience, after finishing each set of
the tasks, for a particular app. The six groups of questions (Table 2,
Appendix A.2) were presented randomly using a 6x6 Latin Square
and the questions within each group were also randomized. We
group the main-study questions into two sets:
Code Verification Task: For each set of challenges, we asked the
participants to follow the instruction on the website to verify the
code for a given contact. The list of the verification methods and
the steps they need to take to verify the code is presented in Table 2
(Appendix A.2). The code verification in our study was performed
in one direction (i.e., only the participant compared the code, not
the examiner).
Feedback Questions: After completing a set of code verification
tasks for a particular application, we asked the participants to rate
their experience by answering feedback questions, including System
Usability Scale (SUS) questions [20], and three additional 5-point
Likert scale question polled for their comfort, satisfaction, and need
for the system. A complete list of the SUS question is included in
Appendix A.1. The other three feedback questions were as follows:
• How comfortable are you with this code verification method?
• How satisfied are you with this code verification method?
• Do you want to use this feature in the future?
4.3.3 Post-Study Phase. In the post-study questions, we asked
the participants about their opinion about the code verification
task. We also asked them if they found any of the code verification
methods easier or more difficult than the others.
5 ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
5.1 Pre-Study and Demographics Data
We recruited 25 participants from a pool of students in our univer-
sity. Participation in the study was voluntary and the time allocated
to each participant to finish the study was 1 hour. There were 54%
males and 46% females among the participants in our study. Most
of the participants were between 18 and 34 years old (34% 18-24
years, 58% 25-34 years, and 8% 35-44 years). 9% of the participants
were high school graduates, 9% had a college degree, 46% had a
Bachelor’s degree and 36% had a Graduate degree. 34% of them
declared that they have excellent, and 62% declared they have good,
general computer skills. 17% had excellent, 50% had good and 33%
had fair security skills (demographic information is summarized in
Table 3) in Appendix A.2. About half of the participants said they
are extremely to moderately aware of the E2EE feature on the apps.
Based on the collected data, the most popular apps among the
participants in our study areWhatsApp, Viber, Telegram, and Signal
(these apps are also the most popular in the market according to
Table 4). Although the participants declared they have heard about
the E2EE feature and used it on the apps, it seems they had not
performed the code verification task much.
5.2 Proximity Code Verification Analysis
In our study, we tested the code verification task in the proximity
setting with QR code of Signal (P1-QR), image code of Telegram
(P2-Image), numeric code of WhatsApp (P3-Numeric). The FAR and
FRR for the proximity setting are reported in Figure 4.
Error Rates: Task P1-QR: For the QR code presentation, the code
verification task is performed almost automatically. The participants
captured the QR code, and after the app verified the code, they
reported the success or failure of code verification on the survey
form. Since in this model the participant is not involved in the
task of manual code comparison, we expected the error rates (both
FRR and FAR) to be near zero. This approach can be considered as
the baseline of the user study. Indeed, as expected, FRR (instances
of rejecting a benign session) for the QR code verification is 0%.
However, the FAR (instances of accepting an attack session) is 1.34%.
This error happened when one participant incorrectly reported that
the code verification was successful even though the app deemed
it as not matching.
Task P2-Image: For the image code verification method, the par-
ticipants compared the image displayed on his/her screen with the
one displayed on the examiner’s screen, and verified whether the
codes on the two devices match or not. Using this method, the FRR
was 0%, which indicates that none of the benign cases was rejected.
The FAR was 2.67%, only slightly higher than FRR.
Task P3-Numeric: For the numeric code verification method, the
participant compared the code displayed on his/her screen with the
one displayed on the examiner’s screen, and verified whether the
codes on the two devices match or not. Similar to the image code
verification, the FRR was 0% while the FAR was 2.67%.
The Friedman test to compare the FAR amongmultiple proximity
code verification methods rendered a Chi-square value of 1.400 and
was not statistically significant.7
User Experience and Perception: The SUS for the QR code
method (66.51) was the highest among all the methods in the prox-
imity setting. A system with SUS score of below 71 is considered to
have an “OK” [17] usability. Since the involvement of the users in
QR code verification was less compared to the other two methods,
we expected the users to prefer this method over the other two
methods. To measure the other user perception parameters, the
participants answered Likert scale questions, rating the comfort,
satisfaction, and adoptability from 1 to 5. The answers to this set of
questions are summarized in Figure 5. It seems that, after QR code,
the numeric code has the next best user perception ratings.
A Friedman test was conducted to compare SUS, comfort, satisfac-
tion and adoptability, among multiple proximity code verification
methods and rendered a Chi-square value of 1.167, 1.214, 1.578, and
4.252 respectively, which were not statistically significant.
7All results of statistical significance are reported at a 95% confidence level.
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Figure 4: The error rates in performing the code verification
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Figure 5: Mean (Std. Dev) of user perception in performing
the code verification task in proximity setting.
The results of the user study shows low error rates (both FRR and
FAR) and moderate user perception ratings for all the approaches
in the proximity setting, demonstrating that the tested E2EE fared
quite well in this setting.
5.3 Remote Code Verification Analysis
In the remote setting, we tested audio-based code verification of
Viber (R1-Audio), image code presentation of Telegram (R2-Image),
and numeric presentation of WhatsApp (R3-Numeric). The FAR
and FRR for the remote setting are reported in Figure 6.
Error Rates: Task R1-Audio: In this task, the code was spoken by
the examiner over a Viber call and the participants compared it
with the code displayed on their device. The FRR was 0% in this
setting, which shows that none of the valid sessions was rejected
by the participants. However, the average FAR was on average
26.45%. The result also suggests that the error rate increased as the
number of mismatching characters decreased as shown in Table
1 (i.e., the success rate of the attack would increase if the attacker
has more control over the number of matching and mismatching
characters in the code). Further, we observe that even if the attacker
can generate a code that is different from the valid code in only one
block, the attacker can compromise about one third of the sessions.
Task R2-Image: For the remote image code verification method,
in which the image was sent as a text message, the FRR was 18.94%.
This result might lower the usability of the system, since the users
would need to repeat the key exchange protocol and the code veri-
fication process. The FAR was 13%, which indicates that the par-
ticipants could not detect some of the attack sessions. In general,
it seems that the users had some difficulty comparing the images.
Perhaps they could not memorize and compare the images that
appeared on two different apps (i.e., text message app, and Telegram
app). Since we did not have access to Telegram image generation
source code or tool, we did not have control over the number of
mismatching characters.
Task R3-Numeric: For the numeric code verification method, the
examiner sent the code in a text message and the participants
compared it with the copy of the code that their app generated. The
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Figure 6: The error rates in performing the code verification
task in remote setting.
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Figure 7: Mean (Std. Dev) of user perception in performing
the code verification task in remote setting.
result shows that the users could not easily compare the numeric
codes across the E2EE and SMS app. The average FRR was 22.94%
and the average FAR was 39.69%. Further, the FAR increased when
the number of mismatching characters decreased, as illustrated in
Table 1. We saw that the attacker can compromise about half of
the sessions, if there is a block of mismatching characters in the
code. The numeric code verification method is deployed by many
apps and is one of the major code verification methods used in the
remote setting. The high error rate in comparing the code shows
that such comparison offers low security and possibly low usability.
The Friedman test to compare the FAR among multiple remote
code verification methods rendered a Chi-square value of 6.306,
and was not statistically significant.
User Experience and Perception: Viber audio-based code verifi-
cation received the highest SUS score (58.05) among all the remote
code verification methods, followed by WhatsApp numeric code
verification (53.78). It seems users did not find Telegram image code
verification very usable in the remote setting (SUS=45.53). Systems
with SUS scores of below 50 are considered to have “poor” usability
[17]. Users also seem to rank Viber audio-based code verification
the highest with respect to comfort, satisfaction, and adoptability,
followed by WhatsApp. Figure 7 summarizes the answers to the
user feedback questions.
The Friedman test was conducted to compare SUS, comfort,
satisfaction and adoptability score, among multiple remote code
verification methods and rendered a Chi-square value of 3.021,
3.381, 4.251, and 6.732 respectively, which were not statistically
significant. Thus, based on our study, we do not observe much
statistical difference between the different remote code comparison
methods in terms of user perception ratings. Most ratings seem to
indicate a poor level of usability for all of these methods. We recall
that comparison between different methods is not the focus of our
study. The primary focus is rather to compare between the remote
and the proximity settings, which we analyze next.
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5.4 Remote vs. Proximity Setting
Error Rates: The Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test indicates a statisti-
cally significant difference between the average FAR and the av-
erage FRR of the methods tested in the proximity setting and the
methods tested in the remote setting, with the p-value of 0.00 for
both FAR and FRR. Thus, in remote setting, the FAR and FRR are
significantly higher than the proximity setting, implying that code
verificationmethod offers a significantly lower security and a higher
chance of rejecting valid sessions. The pairwise comparisons also
showed statistically significant difference between FAR and FRR in
proximity setting and that of remote setting in most cases (detailed
statistical analysis can be found in Table 5 in A.4).
User Experience and Perception: Apart from the error rates, re-
sponses to the feedback questions (user perception) shows that SUS
for all the code verification methods in the remote setting was lower
than the methods in the proximity setting. Also, users generally
were less satisfied and comfortable with the code verification, and
were less willing to use the remote verification methods.
The Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test indicates a significant difference
between the average SUS, comfort, satisfaction, and adoptability
ratings of methods in the proximity setting and methods in the
remote setting, yielding a p-value of 0.005 for the SUS, 0.007 for
comfort, 0.004 for satisfaction, and 0.003 for adoptability (detailed
statistical analysis can be found in Table 5 in A.4).
5.5 Bidirectional Authentication
In the user study, we asked the participants to compare and verify
the code only in one direction. In practice, the E2EE applications
ask both users involved in the conversation to verify each others’
code. However, the code verification on the two devices work inde-
pendently, that is, Alice may verify Bob, while Bob does not verify
Alice. This situation may work in favor of the attacker. If only one
party (Alice or Bob) accepts the attack session, he/she may con-
tinue to send messages, files, or photos that can be eavesdropped
(or tampered) by the attacker.
Therefore, for the attack to be successful, compromising only
one side of the connection is enough to intercept several messages
(even if we assume that one end-point who does not verify the
code does not send any messages or does not initiate any call).
Hence, in practice, the FARs will be higher than the one reported
in our study. For example, FAR is 40% in numeric code verification
considering the attack in only one direction. Same error reaches
64% (= 40% + 40% − 40% × 40%) if the attacker can deceive one of
the two parties. This result essentially shows that, in practice, in
the most common- use case of E2EE apps (the remote setting), the
human errors in comparing the codes could result in the success of
the MITM attack with a high chance.
Table 1: Effect of number of mismatching character(s) on
FAR for remote audio-based and numeric code verification.
Mismatching Characters
Task ID 1 Character 1 Block Whole Code
R1-Audio 37.27% 29.32% 12.75%
R3-Numeric 60.25% 51.69% 7.12%
5.6 Post Study Analysis
At the end of the study, we asked the participants to give us open-
ended comments about the study. We also asked them if they would
prefer proximity setting over the remote setting. The participants
commonly agreed that proximity code verification methods in
which “they are sitting side by side” are easier. Many users found
“QR code to be more user friendly” than the rest of the methods.
Some of the participants found the numeric and image code compar-
ison in the remote setting to be “frustrating” and “time consuming”,
as they have to “switch between windows”.
6 DISCUSSION AND FUTUREWORK
6.1 Strengths and Limitations of Our Study
We believe that our study has several strengths. The analysis of the
pre-study questionnaire responses shows that the participants in
our user study are above the level of average app users in terms
of age, education and computer skills, which suggests that these
participants might have performed better than the average users in
detecting the attacks and might have found the code verification
methods more usable (in terms of SUS, satisfaction, comfort, and
adoptability rating) than average users. The participants in our
study are young and educated students who have declared that they
have excellent and good general computer and security background,
and have used the E2EE feature at least on one of the apps prior
to the study. This sampling of user population serves as a sound
counter-example to support our hypothesis that E2EE apps may not
provide the promised security and usability, specially in a remote
setting. In practice, these apps are used by a more diverse group
of users who may be less technology-aware, and therefore, may
perform worse than our study participants, thereby granting more
opportunity to the attacker to succeed. Similarly, the average real-
world users may find the code verification task much less usable
compared to our study participants.
Finally, in the controlled and monitored lab setting, users might
be subject to the Hawthorne effect compared to real world settings.
Thus, our work shows that the E2EE apps may provide a lower
level of security and usability in practice than what was observed
in our study.
Further, in our study, the participants were involved in one single
task of code verification as the primary task. At the beginning of
the study, we informed the participants about the security risks
of careless code verification and asked them to perform the task
diligently to avoid the attack as much as possible. However, in
real-life, the code verification is an optional task in all the studied
apps. Even those users who verify the codes, may skip through
the process (as reported in prior proximity-based device pairing
studied [29]), since their primary task is to establish the connection
(send a message, or start a call), while verifying the code is only
their secondary optional task. Therefore, in practice, the error rates
might be higher than the one reported in our studies. This means
that the E2EE apps would be even more vulnerable to attacks and
less usable in real-life than what our study has found.
To achieve collision resistance, the current apps aim to use longer
codes. However, longer codes are not easy for human users to
compare. Therefore, some apps truncate it to a shorter code. Since
we studied the real apps, one limitation of our study was that we
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did not have control over the length of the code, although these
codes is what the users are being subject to in real-life. In our study,
only Viber code was 160 bits, while other codes were still the same
length, 256 bits.
6.2 Potential Mitigations & Future Directions
While our work exposes a fundamental vulnerability of the E2EE
apps in the remote setting that arises from the human behavior
that may be challenging to counter, we sketch two of the poten-
tial mitigation strategies and directions that may help curb, if not
eliminate, the said vulnerability.
(1) Multi-Windowing: The post-study open-ended questions re-
vealed that in the remote setting, many users had difficulty compar-
ing the codes received through an out of bandmessaging application
due to the single-tasking interface of the smartphones (i.e, only
one application is displayed on the screen at a given time). Some
of the smartphones allow the users to split the phone’s screen into
two sections and open one app in each portion of the screen. Us-
ing this feature, for code verification, the user can open the E2EE
app’s code verification screen in one portion of the screen and the
out of band messaging app in another portion of the screen. Since
multi-windowing is not available on all smartphones, we have not
evaluated this approach in our study. However, this option would
perhaps make the code verification easier and more robust to errors,
since the user can see both codes at once. This method should be
studied as part of future research.
(2) Automated Code Verification: Human errors in comparing the
codes lead to the success of the MITM attacks against E2EE apps.
Apart from informing the users about the code verification task
and its importance pertaining to the security of the system, one
natural defense against the attack is to reduce the involvement of
the human users by automating the code verification task itself.
Since the threat model assumes trusted devices, the code may be
verified automatically by the E2EE app by reading directly from
within the out-of-band app. However, due to privacy issues, this
automation may not be securely implemented by allowing the apps
to directly access each other’s data (e.g., reading the code from
the SMS by the E2EE app may create privacy concerns). Further
investigation is necessary to explore such a model.
Another possibility for semi-automation is through the use of
the clipboard. In fact, Signal has most recently (after our study
was accomplished) implemented a code verification method for the
remote setting, in which the user copies the received code to the
phone’s clipboard and asks the app to compare and verify the locally
generated code with the one stored in the clipboard. Therefore, the
users do not need to manually compare the code. Although this
method is a step towards automation, further studies are required
to evaluate its security and usability. For example, one problem
with this approach could be that the user copies all data currently
in the clipboard (which may contain sensitive information) and
makes it accessible to the E2EE app.
7 RELATEDWORK
A great number of papers are available that compare different code
verification methods for the device pairing setting (e.g., [27, 28, 34]).
This line of work mainly targets the way the code is exchanged
over a location-limited out-of-band channel (e.g., audio vs video), or
the way it is compared (e.g., Copy-Confirm vs. Compare-Confirm).
Unlike our study, these studies assume the exchange of short codes
(e.g. 6-digit code) in a proximity setting.
Other work [24, 25] compared different forms of representation
of cryptographic keys, such as textual and graphical representations.
In our work, we also consider several practical examples of code
presentation, but more importantly, we study the proximity and
remote code exchange, comparison and verification methods in
the context of real-world smartphone apps geared for end-to-end
remote security. That is, unlike these prior studies, our primary goal
is not to compare across different methods, but rather to compare
between the remote and the proximity settings.
Another recent study [33] has investigated the security and
usability of the code comparison in end-to-end encrypted VoIP apps
in the presence of data and/or voice MITM attack. Their studies
consider short codes (mainly 2-4 words) that are communicated
over the voice channel. Their results show that users’ failure in
verifying the code results in accepting on average about 30% of
the attacked sessions. While their study covers remote audio-code
verification methods with short words, we consider several long
code presentation and code verification methods that are deployed
widely by existing popular messaging and VoIP applications. We
did not consider word representation of codes in our study as these
are not deployed by the most popular apps we focus on in our
work, but the analysis of security and usability of the short word
presentation can be found in [33].
A recent paper by Dechand et al. [21] conducted a usability study
to evaluate performance and usability of the different textual code
representations. In their online study, participants were presented
with several instances of code pairs and were asked to compare
the displayed code to evaluate the performance of the users with
respect to the different representations of the codes (e.g., numeric,
hexadecimal and sentence). They concluded that the use of large
words provided the fastest performance, and sentences achieve the
highest attack detection rate. This study does not compare the code
exchange method and code verification process for any specific
app. The aim of this study was to evaluate how easily different
representations can be compared from the users’ point of view in a
proximity setting, where two codes are shown side by side. Another
limitation is the online study itself that does not capture the exact
user interface of the apps. Our work, in contrast, focuses on the
remote setting and its comparison with the proximity setting. In
addition, our work shows the usability and security of actual phone
apps, not studied before.
8 CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we ran a user study to investigate the security and
usability of the human-centered code verification task deployed
by a representative class of E2EE apps. Our study discloses several
security and usability issues stemming from the human errors in
performing the code verification task in a remote setting. Specifi-
cally, we noticed that several code verification methods offer low
security and low usability in the remote setting (much lower than
the proximity setting).
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Our study design with the security task being the only task at
hand and with well-informed and young participants who per-
formed the security task diligently and willingly, implies that in
real-life situations, the security offered by these apps could be much
lower given that these apps do not inform the users about the secu-
rity risks of erroneous code verification, the real-world users will
not be as tech-savvy as our study participants, the real-world users’
primary task will not be security-centric and the real-world users
may rush through the verification process by simply accepting all
(including attacked) sessions. Besides, in real-world, the attacker’s
success may increase as she can deceive any of the users involved in
a conversation, whereas we studied the attack only in one direction.
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A APPENDIX
A.1 SUS Questionnaire
(1) I think that I would like to use this system frequently.
(2) I found the system unnecessarily complex.
(3) I thought the system was easy to use.
(4) I think that I would need the support of a technical person
to be able to use this system.
(5) I found the various functions in this system were well
integrated.
(6) I thought there was too much inconsistency in this system.
(7) I would imagine that most people would learn to use this
system very quickly.
(8) I found the system very cumbersome to use.
(9) I felt very confident using the system.
(10) I needed to learn a lot of things before I could get going
with this system.
A.2 Additional Tables and Figures
A.3 Messaging Apps
Table 4 shows 10 highly popular E2EE apps. The total number of
the installations and the rating of the apps are derived from the Play
Store and was last updated on this submission on November 06,
2016. iTunes store does not disclose the number of app installations.
Although an estimation can be inferred [23], we believe the current
data from Google Play Store serves well to provide information
about the popularity of the apps.
Some recently introduced apps such as Google Duo and Google
Allo have not yet deployed any code verification method. For other
applications, the code presentations and code verification methods
in proximity and remote setting is given in the table. Some of the
apps such as Telegram and Signal do not offer a feature to directly
transfer/exchange the code from the app. Such applications rely
on the users to compare the codes through an authenticated out
of band channel of their choice. On the other hand, apps such as
Viber and Silent phone do not have an explicit way to compare the
code locally.
Considering the popularity of the application and to cover a vari-
ety of code presentations and code verification methods, we picked
the first four popular apps that offer code verification, namely,
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Table 2: The code verification tasks in the user study.
 Task ID Presentation App Verification Flow / Instruction 
P r
o
x
i m
i t y
 
S e
t t
i n
g  
P1-QR QR Code Signal 1) Tap on contact name in the conversation view. 
2) Tap on ’Verify identity’. 
3) Scan the other user’s QR code. 
P2-Image Image Telegram 1) Open the chat with the contact. 
2) Tap the contact name at top. 
3) Tap the ’Encryption key’ to view the image. 
4) Verify whether the image matches with that of the other contact. 
P3-Numeric Numeric WhatsApp 1) Open the chat with the contact. 
2) Tap on the name of the contact to open the contact info screen. 
3) Tap ’Encryption’ to view the 60-digit number. 
4) Verify the code displayed on your phone and on the other contact’s phone. 
R
e m
o
t e
 
S e
t t
i n
g  
R1-Audio Audio Viber 1) Open the conversation with the contact. 
2) Click on the Gear icon. 
3) Scroll to the bottom of the conversation info screen and select ”Trust this contact”. 
4) Choose “Free Viber Call”. 
5) While on Viber call, click on the Lock icon to see the code. 
6) Listen to the code spoken by the other user. 
7) Verify whether the spoken code and the displayed code match. 
R2-Image Image Telegram 1) Open the chat with the contact. 
2) Tap the contact name at top. 
3) Tap the ’Encryption key’ to view the image. 
4) Receive the image from the other user as a text message. 
5) Verify whether the image matches with the image received in the text message. 
R3-Numeric Numeric WhatsApp 1) Open the chat with the contact. 
2) Tap on the name of the contact to open the contact info screen. 
3) Tap ’Encryption’ to view the 60-digit number. 
4) Receive the 60-digit number of the other user as a text message. 
5) Compare both numbers. 
 
(a) WhatsApp Security Code. (b) Viber Secret Identity Key.
(c) Telegram Encryption Code. (d) Signal Fingerprint.
Figure 8: Presentation of the security codes
WhatsApp, Viber, Telegram, and Signal for the purpose of this
study.
Table 3: Demographic information of the participants
N = 25
Gender
Male 54%
Female 46%
Age
18-24 years 34%
25-34 years 58%
35-44 years 8%
Education
High school graduate or diploma 9%
Some college credit, no degree 9%
Bachelor’s degree 46%
Graduate degree 36%
General Computer Skills
Excellent 34%
Good 62%
Fair 4%
Poor 0%
General Security Skills
Excellent 17%
Good 50%
Fair 33%
Poor 0%
Awareness about E2EE Feature
Extremely aware 17%
Moderately aware 37%
Somewhat aware 16%
Slightly aware 17%
Not at all aware 13%
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Table 4: End-to-End Encrypted Messaging Apps Rating and Reviews
Installs on
Google Play
Rating on
Google Play Votes
Code
Presentation
Code
Length
Proximity Code
Verification
Remote Code
Verification
WhatsApp 1,000,000,000 -5,000,000,000 4.4 45,751,306
QR,
Numeric 60 digit
QR code scanning,
Manual number compare
OOB code exchange
on messaging apps
Viber 500,000,000 -1,000,000,000 4.3 9,339,793 Numeric 48 digit Voice call Voice call
Telegram 100,000,000 -500,000,000 4.3 2,090,485
Image,
Hexadecimal
64
characters
Manual number, and
image comparison
Not available directly
from the app screen,
Any OOB code exchange
Google Duo 10,000,000 -50,000,000 4.3 179,340 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Google Allo 5,000,000 -10,000,000 4.2 146,507 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Signal 1,000,000 -5,000,000 4.6 86,316
QR,
Numeric 60 digit code
QR Code Scanning,
Manual number compare
Not available directly
from the app screen,
Any OOB code exchange
Threema 1,000,000 -5,000,000 4.5 44,160
QR,
Hexadecima 32 characters
QR Code Scanning,
Manual number compare
OOB code exchange
on messaging apps
Wickr Me 1,000,000 -5,000,000 4.2 9,011 N/A N/A Video Video
ChatSecure 500,000 -1,000,000 4 5,211
QR,
Hexadecima 40 characters
QR Code Scanning,
Manual number compare
OOB code exchange
on messaging apps
Silent Phone 100,000 -500,000 3.6 1,028 Words Two words Voice call Voice call
Table 5: The result of the Friedman and Wilcoxon Signed Rank tests to compare the code verification methods in the remote
vs. proximity settings
Friedman Test
p-values Chi-square
FAR 0.000 40.385
FRR 0.003 18.333
SUS 0.000 9.579
Comfort 0.150 14.090
Satisfaction 0.034 12.072
Adoptability 0.007 15.938
p-values of Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test
R1-Audio
vs.
P1-QR
R1-Audio
vs.
P2-Image
R1-Audio
vs.
P3-Numeric
R2-Image
vs.
P1-Q1
R2-Image
vs.
P2-Image
R2-Image
vs.
P3-Numeric
R3-Numeric
vs.
P1-QR
R3-Numeric
vs.
P2-Image
R3-Numeric
vs.
P3-Numeric
FAR 0.007 0.011 0.010 0.063 0.081 0.066 0.001 0.001 0.001
FRR 0.000 0.010 0.010 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.025 0.025 0.025
SUS 0.085 0.614 0.637 0.016 0.099 0.033 0.008 0.551 0.150
Comfort 0.380 1.000 0.177 0.029 0.048 0.093 0.013 0.0191 0.018
Satisfaction 0.133 0.874 0.156 0.007 0.027 0.008 0.070 0.902 0.233
Adoptability 0.068 1.000 0.226 0.006 0.046 0.022 0.017 0.565 0.110
A.4 Statistical Analysis of Remote vs.
Proximity Setting
The non-parametric Friedman test followed by theWilcoxon signed-
rank test with Bonferroni correction was conducted to compare
the error rates and the user perception among different code veri-
fication methods in remote and proximity setting. The results are
summarized in Table 5.
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